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Barcelona GSE Working Paper No. 712

Title: Monotone Strategyproofness
Authors: Hanna Halaburda, Guillaume Haeringer
Date: 07-08-2013
Keywords: strategyproofness, Kemeny sets, misrepresentations, dominant strategy
JEL Codes: C72, D41
We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a mechanism to be monotone strategyproof when declaring a "more truthful" preference ordering in the mechanism dominates - with respect to the true preferences - declaring a less truthful preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for probabilistic social choice functions it holds under a mild assumption on the domain.
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