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Barcelona GSE Working Paper No. 681

Title: Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money
Authors: David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor
Date: 14-02-2013
Keywords: matching, competitive equilibrium, optimal competitive equilibrium, manipulability, competitive equilibrium mechanism, competitive equilibrium rule
JEL Codes: C78, D78
Abstract:
We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985).
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