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Barcelona GSE Working Papers Series
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Barcelona GSE Working Paper No. 681 | | Title: | Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money | | Authors: | David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor | | Date: | 14-02-2013 | | Keywords: | matching, competitive equilibrium, optimal competitive equilibrium, manipulability, competitive equilibrium mechanism, competitive equilibrium rule | | JEL Codes: | C78, D78 | | Abstract: | | We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange, 1982, Leonard, 1983, Demange and Gale, 1985). | | Download this working paper in PDF format (267.75 Kb) |  List of all recent working papers |
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