Barcelona GSE: Graduate School of Economics

Contact Barcelona GSE | FAQ | News | Events

Home » Research » Working Papers

Barcelona GSE Working Papers Series

Barcelona GSE Research Community

Barcelona GSE Working Paper No. 550

Title: Displacement, Signaling, and Recall Expectations
Authors: Néria Rodréguez-Planas
Date: 12-04-2011
Keywords: Asymmetric information, laid-off workers, recalls, unemployment, and wages
JEL Codes: J60, J30
Abstract:
This paper is the first to present empirical evidence consistent with models of signaling through unemployment and to uncover a new stylized fact using the 1988-2006 DWS, namely that, among white-collar workers, post-displacement earnings fall less rapidly with unemployment spells for layoffs than for plant closings. Because high-productivity workers are more likely to be recalled than low-productivity ones, they may choose to signal their productivity though unemployment, in which case the duration of unemployment may be positively related to post-displacement wages. Identification is done using workers whose plant closed as they cannot be recalled, and no incentives to signal arise.
Download this working paper in PDF format (343.91 Kb)
« List of all recent Barcelona GSE working papers
Search all working papers:
By author:
By date:
from to
By keyword(s):
By JEL code(s):
 

Home » Research » Working Papers