Working Papers # 412 |
| Title: | Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market |
| Authors: | by Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels |
| Date: | 03-11-2009 |
| Keywords: | assignment game, core, dominance, von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set |
| JEL Codes: | C71 |
| Abstract: |
| Existence of von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions (stable sets) is proved for any
assignment game. For each optimal matching, a stable set is defined as the union
of the core of the game and the core of the subgames that are compatible with this
matching. All these stable sets exclude third-party payments and form a lattice with
respect to the same partial order usually defined on the core. |
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